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Advocacy coalitions and flood insurance: power and policies in the Australian 
Natural Disaster Insurance Review 
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The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT 
 
Abstract 
 
Insurance against flooding creates households and places that are protected against 
financial harm in the form of catastrophic losses. Contested here are questions 
surrounding the availability and affordability of private insurance cover, significantly 
affecting the lives of people in at-risk geographies by imposing costs either as 
insurance premiums or episodic flood damages. Policy choices and decisions 
(‘political/economic’) about such controversial place-based environmental/risk issues 
(‘spatial’) are often made “behind closed doors”. A public inquiry opens those doors, 
albeit briefly, so we can see “what goes on”. The Natural Disaster Insurance Review 
(NDIR), a public inquiry after the 2010/2011 Australian floods, was a major forum of 
debate about Australian flood insurance policy. We explore the intricate politics of 
the key advocacy coalitions involved, to understand NDIR’s role and outcomes. Our 
case study methodology uses content analysis of c. 100 NDIR submissions and 
reports, media coverage, and insurance industry and government statements, 
supported by in-depth interviews with people directly involved. We show that a well-
resourced and powerful coalition of insurers was the dominant advocacy coalition in 
the NDIR and that consumers and their at-risk communities were represented by a 
relatively under-resourced coalition. The primary role of the inquiry as a problem-
solving process was ultimately overridden during the post-inquiry implementation 
phase, during which the insurance coalition was dominant. Major NDIR 
recommendations were not implemented, and hence key spatial/political issues that 
the inquiry was established to address for the benefit of those at risk remained 
unresolved. 
 
Keywords: Floods; insurance; public inquiry; Advocacy coalitions; spatial politics 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Flood insurance is an important instrument in flood risk management, as a 
means of risk transfer to spread the cost of irregular and episodic flood losses over 
space and time. Yet, as in other countries, the form that the Australian flood 
insurance system should assume is debated. Following the 2010/2011 floods in 
eastern Australia, several inquiries were established, including the Natural Disaster 
Insurance Review (NDIR), which led to recommendations for flood insurance policy 
changes in Australia.  
The aim of this paper is, first, to address the question of who were the 
dominant advocacy coalitions in the NDIR, and second, to use this understanding to 
analyse the role of the inquiry in the Australian flood insurance policy landscape in its                                                         
1 Corresponding author: Edmund@penningrowsell.com 
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international context. We use here an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) approach 
as the theoretical lens through which to examine the nature, strength and impact of 
inputs from coalitions of participants in the NDIR process. We use the ACF because it 
requires us to examine the core beliefs of actors, which in turn can reveal 
fundamental insurer-consumer-government political relations and hence important 
human-spatial risk related values and interactions.  
But first we give an overview below of Australian flood insurance policy, some 
background on the role of public inquiries generally and the ideas behind the AFC. We 
then provide an outline of our research methodology, discuss our research results, 
and draw conclusions on the influence of the NDIR inquiry process and its spatial 
politics on those at risk of flooding. 
 
Australian flood insurance policy 
 
There are numerous challenges in insuring against floods, as core insurability 
criteria (i.e. sufficient information; independent and fortuitous losses; sufficient 
demand; and acceptable premiums) are often not met (Arnell, 2000). Historically, 
flood insurance has not been widely available in Australia (Handmer, 2008; Mason, 
2011), partly due to issues with insurability (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014). 
However, in the years leading up to the 2010/2011 floods, progress by individual 
insurance companies resulted in some increased availability (Mason, 2011). Yet, flood 
insurance penetration (i.e. aggregate take-up) at the time of these floods was still 
relatively low. The floods highlighted a large protection gap, with many individuals 
only having partial flood cover (Swiss Re, 2017). 
In Australia, as elsewhere, flood insurance is one component of a broader 
suite of flood risk management strategies. Flood risk management involves multiple 
public and private actors operating at different scales and at different stages of the 
risk management cycle (mitigation/prevention, preparation, response and recovery).  
Current Australian flood risk management is guided by the National Strategy 
for Disaster Resilience (2011), which outlines a resilience-based approach based on 
the principles of shared responsibility across spatial scales and political entities. In 
terms of government involvement, risk mitigation planning is spatially differentiated 
with the main responsibility resting with the State and Territory governments but 
with mitigation plans implemented by local councils and floodplain management 
authorities. Key government agencies involved in the preparation and response 
phases of the flood risk management cycle include the State and Territory Emergency 
Services, and the national Bureau of Meteorology, which provides flood warning 
services. Government funding in the aftermath of a flood event is guided by the 
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements Determination, which prescribes 
the Federal Government (i.e. Commonwealth) financial support that can be provided 
to State Governments and affected communities. In addition to these government 
actors, individuals and communities have responsibilities. As outlined in the National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience (CoAG, 2011), purchasing insurance is one of the main 
risk management options available to individuals.  
With flood risk management operating at these multiple spatial scales, 
Australian flood insurance policy discussions inherently involve the politics of space. 
Power struggles exist within these spatial politics, with different governments 
drawing power from their different responsibilities (see also Self and Penning-
Rowsell, 2018). Whilst general insurance regulation is the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth Government, State and Territory Governments have responsibility for 
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flood preparedness and response within their jurisdictions, and local governments 
have responsibility for development and community infrastructure planning thus 
affecting risk levels ‘on the ground’. 
Internationally, there are several approaches to flood insurance, which differ 
in terms of the primary provider (public or private), and whether or not flood 
insurance is included as part of standard cover. In Australia, flood insurance is 
provided via the private market, and cover is either bundled with other perils or 
offered as an add-on (Penning-Rowsell and Priest, 2015). The scheme design has 
important implications in terms of the scheme’s robustness to uncertainty, claims 
clustering, and rising losses, and its role in incentivising flood risk mitigation (Lamond 
and Penning-Rowsell, 2014). The transparency of  flood premiums in add-on schemes 
can incentivise risk mitigation, while bundling may promote higher penetration, 
impacting the extent of take-up (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014).  
The market-based Australian scheme, in which the availability of flood cover is 
not mandated by government and in which most insurance policies are renewed 
annually, creates an environment in which insurers may withdraw cover swiftly if 
profitability is threatened (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014). This provides a 
potential source of power for insurers in their relationships with government, since 
governments are concerned that such a withdrawal could increase the government’s 
flood recovery burden (Penning-Rowsell and Priest, 2015). Australian regions with 
highest flood exposures, such as parts of Queensland (ICA, 2019), may be more 
strongly affected by such power tensions, and as such, the political landscape varies 
spatially, at least partly in accordance with geographical  variations in flood risk. In 
contrast to other countries, such as the United States, where insurance is influenced 
by a history of States-based insurance markets rather than a national one (Swiss Re, 
2013), in Australia the insurance industry is dominated by companies operating 
nationally rather than only in an individual State. As such, they are large, and have a 
strong interest in policy discussions and decisions at nationwide spatial scales. 
There is a recurring cycle of flood insurance policy debate in Australia, with 
increased attention following severe flood events, such as the 1875 Maitland, 1974 
Brisbane, and 1998 Wollongong floods (Box et al., 2013). Recurring concerns include 
availability, affordability, and clarity of flood insurance policies (Mason, 2011). 
However, despite periodic cycles of attention, there was no substantial change in 
flood insurance policy prior to 2011 (Mason, 2011). Indeed, the Australian experience 
was similar to that of the UK, where, prior to the recent establishment of Flood Re, 
flood insurance policy was quite stable, despite numerous windows of opportunity for 
change created by flood events (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014). In the wake of the 
2010/2011 Australian floods, issues of consumer confusion and flood insurance 
availability and affordability resurfaced (Bell, 2011, 2012), and were a major focus of 
the NDIR. 
 
The role of public inquiries 
 
Public inquiries have a long history of use in Australia (Prasser, 2016), but their 
utility is disputed. Banks (2007) argues that they provide a thorough information 
platform for policymakers, resulting in better policies. In contrast, Eburn and Dovers 
(2015) argue that despite more than 50 post-disaster inquiries having occurred in 
Australia over the past 75 years they have not led to useful learning. 
Several reasons for establishing public inquiries have been suggested. Gilligan 
(2002) separates pragmatic functions (collecting information and making 
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recommendations) from political functions. These political functions may be to 
postpone or avoid decision-making about contentious issues; to provide symbolic 
action; to legitimise predetermined government policy; and to pacify interest groups 
(Gilligan, 2002; Prasser, 2016; Rowe and McAllister, 2006). In our research we 
primarily used and report here on Hunter and Boswell’s (2015) three main public 
inquiry functions:  
 
(i) problem-solving (providing expert policy advice);  
(ii) substantiating (providing evidence for extant preferred policy 
decisions); and  
(iii) legitimising (signalling that the government is taking an issue 
seriously). 
 
Importantly, these can come with different spatial and political implications, 
and therefore potentially different meanings in our case for those exposed to 
flooding, many of whom were uninsured. The first suggests a determination to 
consider moving away from the status quo by investigating potential new policy 
positions. The second can mean either that or a resistance to change, depending on 
what policy decisions have been made prior to an inquiry and reflected in its terms of 
reference. The third generally is more to do with maintaining the status quo. 
Despite these multiple theories about the functions of public inquiries, the 
process of identifying governments’ motivations for an inquiry is not straightforward, 
particularly since the reasons publicly stated by governments may not reflect true 
motivations (Prasser, 2016). However, a number of indicators has been identified to 
assist in the analysis of the role of public inquiries, including panel membership, 
resources, timeframe, terms of reference, dissemination, and government take-up 
(Hunter and Boswell, 2015).  
In this paper, we consider these motivating factors in the two periods of 
government involvement in the NDIR: (i) the inquiry’s establishment, during which 
the panel membership, resources, timeframe and terms of reference were 
determined; and (ii) the post-inquiry period, including the dissemination of the NDIR 
report and the take-up of inquiry recommendations. By separating Hunter and 
Boswell’s (2015) factors into those two phases we distinguish between the 
government’s initial intentions regarding the role of the NDIR and the inquiry’s 
ultimate function. 
We explore this also within the context of the relevant politics of space 
(Penning-Rowsell and Johnson, 2015). These we see in terms of the struggles between 
scales (e.g. between consumers/communities, the Australian States and its national 
bodies) related to the differential power and influence at these scales, rather than 
simply the political processes occurring at those different scales. We reflect on how 
the politics of space contributed to, or impeded, the achievement of the intended 
role of the NDIR.  
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
 
A key theoretical framework in the study of policy processes is the ACF 
(Sabatier, 1988). We use this framework to analyse the NDIR because public inquiries 
are a classic case of where groups of coordinated actors with certain common beliefs 
(i.e. coalitions) engage in policy debates with the aim of influencing the policy 
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outcomes of the inquiry process, and because the influence of such coalitions on the 
NDIR outcomes appears to have been crucial. 
As described by Sabatier (1998), the policy subsystem is the primary unit of 
analysis in the ACF (Figure 1). A policy subsystem is composed of interacting actors 
from multiple institutions interested in influencing a policy area (Sabatier, 1988), 
which is typically defined by both a functional dimension (in this case, flood insurance 
policy) and a territorial one (in this case, Australia) (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). 
Advocacy coalitions are a key component of the subsystem,  consisting of actors “who 
share a particular belief system — i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and 
problem perceptions — and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity 
over time” (Sabatier, 1988: 139).  
Shared beliefs operate at two levels, with policy core beliefs conceptualised as 
the application of deep core beliefs to a particular subsystem. Actors also have 
secondary beliefs, which relate to a subcomponent of the policy subsystem and are 
less resistant to change. Policy subsystems are situated within a broader context, 
which includes relatively stable sociocultural parameters, as well as more dynamic 
external subsystem events (such as floods), both of which influence subsystem affairs. 
Public policies are translations of belief systems, and advocacy coalitions seek to 
influence policymakers such that policies reflect their beliefs. The capacity of 
coalitions to influence the policy subsystem is shaped by their power resources, 
including financial resources, information, leadership, mobilisable supporters, and 
their legal authority to make policy decisions (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
According to Stark (2015), public inquiry research has a tendency to neglect 
the analysis of actors involved in an inquiry beyond the central bureaucracy and the 
inquiry panel;  advocacy coalitions are overlooked. He proposes the application of the 
ACF to inquiry analysis, and hypothesises, “inquiries can be influenced by the core 
beliefs of advocacy coalitions” (p. 15). Although Weaver-Hightower (2014) and 
Inwood and Johns (2016) discuss various actors in their analyses of public inquiries, in 
neither of these papers are the actors analysed as advocacy coalitions, and the phase 
of inquiry recommendation implementation is not considered. Instead, this latter gap 
is identified as an avenue for further research (Inwood and Johns, 2016). 
The gap in the public inquiry literature pertaining to a lack of analysis of 
advocacy coalitions is aligned with a gap in the ACF literature, with Jenkins-Smith et 
al. (2014: 206) identifying analysis of “venues and forums within policy subsystems” 
as an avenue for further research; ours, in response, involves one such venue, viz. the 
public inquiry. Stark (2018) has recently developed the application of the ACF 
framework to the study of public inquiry processes but previously few AFC empirical 
studies have had this focus. Dudley and Richardson (1996) discuss how a series of 
highway public inquiries in the 1970s became “the cockpit” where two adversarial 
advocacy coalitions fought. Kübler (2001) applied the ACF to Swiss drugs policy, 
showing how, through demonstrating support in public inquiry procedures, alliances 
formed between coalitions. The ACF has previously been applied to some policy 
studies in flood risk management (e.g. Meijerink, 2005; Knight, 2019) but, to our 
knowledge, this is the first time that it has been used to study flood insurance. 
In this paper, we consider the influence of advocacy coalitions throughout the 
NDIR process, including the recommendation take-up phase, and utilise this 
understanding to analyse the function of the NDIR and the effect of its policy 
processes generally. We explore how analysis of advocacy coalitions may facilitate a 
better understanding of how individuals and organisations influence public inquiry 
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outcomes, and the ultimate role of this public inquiry in the landscape of flood risk 
management.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (reproduced from Sabatier 
and Weible, 2007) 
 
Methodology 
 
In taking the example of the NDIR, we have adopted a case study research 
design. The principal rationale for our single-case study is what Yin (2009) refers to as 
the “revelatory” rationale, whereby we have an opportunity to study a phenomenon 
previously inaccessible to social science researchers. 
Such public inquiries as the NDIR have the advantage of making the process of 
policy review and decision-making more transparent than is usually the case with 
government-led policy processes, many of which are hidden “behind closed doors”. 
Analysis of policy debates is therefore typically methodologically difficult, since 
negotiations generally occur outside the public realm (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014) 
and detailed information is scanty or non-existent. Inquiries generate much 
documentation from all sides, and generally conclude with explicit recommendations, 
and therefore provide a useful window into key debates and their outcomes. In 
researching this public inquiry we can therefore examine the inputs of its many 
participants and the recommendations and policy changes that resulted. 
The focus of the inquiry on the policy subsystem of interest (namely that 
pertaining to Australian flood insurance policy), as well as its national scale (which 
enables the analysis of issues at a range of spatial scales from local to national), led us 
to the NDIR. It is worth noting that the NDIR was not the only public inquiry tackling 
flood insurance policy issues at this time. Indeed, other inquiries were occurring at 
State levels (e.g. the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry; the State Government 
of Victoria’s Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response), highlighting that 
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policy discussions were occurring at different spatial scales. However, with its 
submissions from numerous sub-national organisations and governments, the NDIR is 
a useful case for analysing the overall policy subsystem at a national scale. This is 
important since, as we have stressed, flood risk management policy decisions occur at 
all level of governments, from national to local, and this inquiry uniquely captures 
these different scales and their interactions. 
Case study research is characterised by methodological pluralism, with 
researchers often using a combination of methods (Thomas, 2011). We used a 
qualitative multimethod research approach to enable a variety of different questions 
to be explored (thereby achieving a fuller understanding), and enable more 
confidence in the validity of our research findings (Hunter and Brewer, 2015). More 
specifically, our study involved content analysis of the NDIR report and c. 100 publicly 
available submissions to the inquiry, as well as dozens of related industry and 
government statements and media reports related to the inquiry. 
In addition, we conducted seven semi-structured interviews with those who 
were directly involved with the inquiry. Potential interviewees were selected by 
identifying the authors of key NDIR documents, and subsequently a snowball 
sampling approach was utilized to identify additional interviewees so as to represent 
a range of perspectives on the NDIR. Inevitably not all individuals responded to our 
interview request but we judge that the final interviewees covered the key actors and 
coalitions involved, and included a government adviser (Interviewee 1), two NDIR 
panel members (Interviewees 2 and 3), three employees of different insurance 
companies who were involved in writing submissions to the inquiry (Interviewees 4-
6), and a consumer advocate (Interviewee 7). Questions posed related to the role of 
the NDIR, and the scalar and institutional positions and views of the actors active in 
the inquiry. The interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed. Insights 
gained are used to support the documentary evidence, and add depth to the analysis, 
but the interviews should not be regarded as the main source of data in this research. 
Evidence from both the many documents and the interviews was used to 
analyse: (i) the intended role of the NDIR, as revealed by key characteristics of its 
establishment; (ii) the advocacy coalitions in the NDIR in relation to their beliefs, 
geographies, resources and influence; and (iii) the ultimate role of the NDIR in 
Australian flood insurance policy evolution, and the impact of the different advocacy 
coalitions on any difference between the intended and ultimate functions of that 
inquiry. 
 
Results and Discussion 
        The intended role of the NDIR 
 
The Hon. Bill Shorten MP announced the NDIR in March 2011, following floods 
in eastern Australia in late 2010 and early 2011. The principal theme of the review 
was to be “the availability and affordability of insurance offered by the private 
insurance market, with particular reference to flood” (NDIR, 2011: 1). In this section 
of the paper we consider those of Hunter and Boswell’s (2015) indicators of the role 
of public inquiries that relate to the inquiry establishment, in order to elucidate the 
government’s motivations for establishing the NDIR.  
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Panel composition 
 
Two of the three panel members were former insurance company executives. 
John Trowbridge, a high-profile actuary and “industry heavyweight” (Interviewee 2), 
was appointed the chair of the Review, with John Berrill and Jim Minto as panel 
members. Prior to his appointment, Trowbridge was an executive member of the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA; the national prudential regulator of 
banks, insurance companies and superannuation funds). His role at APRA followed an 
extensive career in the insurance industry, including executive positions with Suncorp 
and QBE Insurance, two large Australian insurers. Minto also had extensive industry 
experience, including a period as Managing Director of TOWER Australia, the third 
largest life insurance company in Australia (NDIR, 2011).  
The decision to appoint two former insurance industry executives is reflective 
of the role of insurers in flood insurance policymaking in Australia. Berrill is a high-
profile insurance and superannuation lawyer, and was appointed because of his legal 
knowledge (Interviewee 1) and his involvement in consumer affairs, which helped to 
create a more balanced panel (Interviewee 2) and contributed to consumer trust in 
the NDIR process (Interviewee 7).  
The extensive knowledge of each of the appointed panel members suggests 
that the inquiry was valued for its problem-solving function (Hunter and Boswell, 
2015). However, it also enabled the NDIR to “turn … into a technical inquiry” 
(Interviewee 2). This gave power to the dominant coalition of insurers, who, as 
described below, had access to technical resources. According to Interviewee 2, 
“most of the big submissions, the heavy-hitting submissions, came from (the 
insurance) industry”. 
 
Resources and timeframe  
 
The Review was well resourced (Interviewee 2), and the panel received 
support from the Australian Government Actuary and a working group from the 
Commonwealth Treasury. These resources supported the inquiry’s technical nature. 
The panel was required to provide its recommendations by 30 September 2011.  
The 7-month timeframe enabled the recommendations of the Review to be 
available for consideration in the implementation of the National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience. This suggests that the government intended for the inquiry to inform 
policy changes, and thus it is unlikely the Review was merely established to avoid 
decision-making.  
However, one panel member expressed regrets that the NDIR panel “gave 
greater priority to finishing on time than to debating with Treasury and the Minister 
what [the NDIR panel members] were going to recommend” (Interviewee 3), citing 
this lack of on-going dialogue as a factor that contributed to the lack of government 
acceptance of NDIR recommendations. 
 
Terms of reference 
 
The terms of reference outlined three guiding principles. The first 
(“Government intervention in private insurance markets is justifiable only where, and 
to the extent that there is clear failure by those private markets to offer appropriate 
cover at affordable premiums”; NDIR, 2011: ii) reflects the non-interventionist beliefs 
of the coalition of insurers (see “Advocacy coalitions involved in the NDIR”, below). 
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The second (“The appropriate mitigation of risk by individuals and governments at all 
levels is a key objective”; NDIR, 2011: ii) and third principles (“Individuals and 
businesses should be encouraged to insure themselves where practicable”; NDIR, 
2011: ii) also steer the Review towards recommendations that are acceptable to the 
insurance industry. The insurance industry had expressed its desire for more 
extensive risk mitigation (ICA, 2011a), and the encouragement of insurance uptake in 
this way would support the growth of the Australian insurance industry. 
In addition to the issue of availability and affordability of insurance, the scope, 
as outlined in the terms of reference, covers issues related to consumers’ awareness 
and understanding of insurance products. These issues were also concerns of the ICA 
(ICA 2011a). Although the scope required the Review to consider “whether there is a 
role for the Commonwealth Government in providing disaster insurance or 
reinsurance” (NDIR, 2011: ii), this is tempered by the requirement that the “impact of 
any Commonwealth Government intervention in disaster insurance on the private 
insurance market” (NDIR, 2011: ii) be considered.  
Thus the terms of reference suggest that in the initial inquiry establishment 
phase, the government attempted to guide the Review to produce recommendations 
that were aligned with the beliefs of the coalition of insurers. This degree of control in 
the terms of reference is indicative of a substantiating function of the public inquiry 
(Hunter and Boswell, 2015). However, during the inquiry itself, “it can’t be said that 
[the government] leaned on [the panel] to come up with the right outcome. And if 
they did, it didn’t work” (Interviewee 2). This independence suggests a problem-
solving or legitimising function (Hunter and Boswell, 2015).  
Arguably the mention of a possible Commonwealth Government role in 
disaster insurance provides some soft pressure on the industry to proactively address 
consumer availability and affordability concerns in order to retain their social license 
as insurance providers. The importance of meeting not only regulatory obligations but 
also societal obligations has since emerged as a key theme in Hayne’s Financial 
Services Royal Commission, established in December 2017 (Chanticleer, 2018). 
Whilst the terms of reference enabled the inquiry to discuss some key aspects 
of flood insurance policy, several inquiry submissions argue that the scope should 
have been wider, to enable the role of insurance within the wider portfolio of risk 
management policy options in Australia to be considered, particularly in terms of 
mitigation (e.g. Allianz, 2011; Gordon, 2011; Sergeant, 2011; IAG, 2011; Mahon and 
Mahon, 2011; Lloyd’s, 2011; Suncorp, 2011; ICA, 2011b). Indeed the submission from 
the Tasmanian Government (2011) argued that the focus on extending the availability 
and affordability of flood insurance “should not be the primary objective of the 
Review” but it should rather consider other flood risk management tools available to 
government, highlighting tensions between governments operating at different scales 
in the definition of the terms of reference of the NDIR.  
The power relationships of the spatial politics are highlighted by the decision 
of the federal government to exercise their power, whilst setting the terms of 
reference, by calling for the examination of the impact (or lack thereof) of State and 
local government flood mitigation measures on the availability and affordability of 
insurance. However, this action may also be regarded as an attempt to examine the 
issue of flood insurance policy in a broader context, to facilitate problem-solving. 
Based on the above analysis of indicators of the role of public inquiries, on 
balance the government’s intention in establishing the NDIR was for it to have a 
problem-solving role. This conclusion is supported by the decision to appoint 
experienced panellists, provide technical resources, and ensure that the report was 
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delivered in a timely manner. Evidence from our interviews also supports this finding, 
with Interviewees 1-5 and 7 stating that the role of the inquiry was, at least in part, 
intended to be problem-solving (i.e. providing expert policy advice).  However, the 
role that was intended for a public inquiry at its establishment may differ from its 
ultimate function. In order to understand this we next consider the influence of key 
advocacy coalitions involved in the NDIR, the final NDIR recommendations, and the 
subsequent take-up of these recommendations.  
 
Advocacy coalitions involved in the NDIR 
 
Our analysis reveals two advocacy coalitions were engaged in the NDIR: a 
coalition of insurers, and a consumer coalition. These coalitions differ substantially in 
their core beliefs, resources and degree of influence in the NDIR, particularly in the 
post-inquiry phase of recommendation implementation. 
The coalition of insurers consisted of the Insurance Council of Australia (ICA), 
which is the representative body of the Australian general insurance industry, and 
insurers, including Suncorp, Insurance Australia Group (IAG), Allianz, Lloyd’s, and 
Wesfarmers Insurance, most of which operate nationwide rather than only at regional 
spatial scales. Overall, their beliefs were relatively uniform across the advocacy 
coalition (Interviewees 4 and 6), with members sharing a deep core belief that 
government intervention into private insurance markets should be minimised 
(Interviewee 2; ICA, 2011b; Lloyd’s, 2011; Suncorp, 2011). This deep core belief is 
linked to their policy beliefs expressed in their submissions. Actors opposed proposed 
interventions such as introduction of automatic flood cover, compulsory insurance, 
and, with the exception of Allianz and CHU, a flood insurance pool (Interviewees 1 
and 5). The apparent cohesiveness of the coalition is enhanced by the ICA, which 
develops and presents a consensus industry position (Interviewee 5).  
The consumer coalition was less organised than the insurer coalition, and 
consisted primarily of consumer representative organisations, whose beliefs were not 
completely aligned with those of all the individual consumers who made submissions 
to the NDIR. Key organisations include the Consumer Action Law Centre, the 
Brotherhood of St Lawrence and state-based legal aid centres. According to 
Interviewee 7, a member of a consumer representative organisation, there is 
coordination between the small group of consumer organisations working in 
insurance in Australia. Although there is no single body responsible for presenting a 
consensus position (unlike the insurer coalition, which is represented by the ICA), the 
consumer advocacy organisations “work together and talk to each other in preparing 
submissions and presenting views” (Interviewee 7). Such coordination is arguably 
important to enable this group of mostly sub-national actors to influence policy 
discussions occurring at a national spatial scale. 
Alongside this coordination, the consumer representative organisations 
generally share the same beliefs (Interviewee 7), and thus constitute an advocacy 
coalition. In the case of the NDIR, the similarity of beliefs of the members of the 
consumer coalition is not fully evident from the content of the submissions 
themselves, with most consumer representative organisation submissions focused on 
presenting the experiences of consumers rather than commenting on particular policy 
options. However, where they do comment on policy options, there is generally 
agreement between the positions presented. For example, both the Brotherhood of 
St Lawrence (2011) and the Consumer Action Law Centre (2011) present support for 
the development of alternative payment options. In addition to making submissions 
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to the inquiry, consumer organisations also engaged in the NDIR process during 
consultations for a consumer perspective paper authored by Chris Connolly 
commissioned by the NDIR (Connolly, 2011).  
Not all organisations consulted for that perspective paper made separate 
submissions, though those that did and refer to the paper are supportive of it (e.g. 
Consumer Action Law Centre, 2011), suggesting a degree of shared beliefs. Cross-
references to the work of other consumer organisations in submissions provide 
additional evidence of shared beliefs. For example, the Consumer Action Law Centre 
submission states, “We strongly support the recommendations of the recent report 
from the Brotherhood of St Laurence” (2011). However, despite the shared beliefs of 
consumer representative organisations, there is disagreement in the beliefs of 
consumers more widely, as highlighted by the lack of alignment of individual 
consumer submissions. Consumer submissions represented divided opinions on policy 
questions such as whether or not all home insurance policies should include flood 
cover, and whether or not flood insurance discounts should be provided to eligible 
homes. According to a panel member, the views of consumers were “coloured heavily 
by political persuasion” (Interviewee 3). Most individual consumer submissions were 
brief, anecdotal, and did not engage with the discussion about policy options. 
The insurance industry advocacy coalition had numerous resources that 
enhanced its capacity to influence the policy subsystem. Based on return on equity, 
the Australian non-life insurance industry is the most profitable in the world (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2016). Large insurers have well-resourced public policy and 
government affairs departments (Interviewees 4-6). These departments had a major 
role in the NDIR, as revealed by Interviewee 3, who worked in the public policy 
department of a major insurer: “My job was to make sure that it [the insurance 
company] got what it wanted [in the NDIR]. I think that occurred.” The ICA also had 
resources for government lobbying (ICA, 2016). These resources dedicated to public 
policy and government relations support another significant resource of the coalition, 
namely a close relationship with people with legal authority to make policy decisions 
(Interviewees 4 and 6). According to Interviewee 6, “Insurers are regarded by 
governments as responsible and trusted advisers.” The advocacy coalition also had 
members who held significant positions on the NDIR panel, as discussed above. The 
coalition was also well resourced in terms of information. The ICA has access to 
technical researchers (ICA, 2016), and Allianz, IAG, Lloyd’s and Suncorp had sufficient 
resources to deliver lengthy technical submissions to the NDIR (Allianz, 2011; IAG, 
2011; Lloyd’s, 2011; Suncorp, 2011). Furthermore, the multi-state nature of the 
operations of most insurers lends itself to a good understanding of policy issues at a 
nationwide scale. 
In contrast, consumers did not engage as deeply with the policy questions 
discussed in the NDIR. More fundamentally, lack of awareness about the existence of 
the NDIR was mentioned in several consumer submissions. For example, the 
submission from Frank Frazer commented, “It was quite by accident that I became 
aware of this review. […] A check of your website would indicate that the Minister has 
made only three press releases on the matter in the last four months. Obviously, not 
enough, for such an important issue” (2011).  
This lack of awareness of the inquiry may have negatively impacted the ability 
of the consumer coalition to recruit mobilisable supporters and to gain wider 
community traction. In general, consumer submissions were substantially shorter 
than the industry submissions, and many recount personal experiences, or 
communicate their belief that there is a lack of equity in the current flood insurance 
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system, without necessarily engaging in the discussion of potential policy solutions. 
Indeed, some submissions accompany an account of a personal experience with a 
plea, such as “please find a solution” (Cracknell, 2011).  
According to one of the NDIR panel members, there was a lack of consumer 
understanding about potential solutions, and discussions with consumers did not 
focus significantly on solutions (Interviewee 3). The lack of engagement of consumers 
with the discussion of potential policy solutions suggests that the technical nature of 
the inquiry may have precluded engagement from actors without technical 
knowledge. This may support the notion that inquiries can signify “a system of 
intellectual collusion” (Burton and Carlon, 1979: 8). Individual consumer submissions 
that do make recommendations, such as for a National Disaster Relief Fund Lotto 
(Smith, 2011), a 1% levy on insurance companies (McCabe, 2011), or a $100 rebate 
for people in high-risk areas (Jones, 2011), lack quantitative analysis to support their 
suggestions. According to Interviewee 7, the lack of power of consumers compared 
with insurers impacted the overall NDIR process, “particularly in the government 
take-up phase”. 
As discussed in the remainder of this paper, the imbalance in the power of the 
insurer and consumer advocacy coalitions did not substantially affect the balance of 
the NDIR recommendations but affected the phase of recommendation 
implementation. In doing so, it impeded the ability of the NDIR to fulfil its intended 
problem-solving role. 
 
The NDIR’s recommendations 
 
Despite the more in-depth level of engagement in the NDIR from the well-
resourced advocacy coalition of insurers compared with that of consumers, the 47 
recommendations of the inquiry were not more in line with the position of the insurer 
coalition than they were with the consumer coalition position. Rather, the 
recommendations were consistently aligned with the position presented by the 
consumer advocacy coalition, where a view was evident in their submissions or in the 
commissioned consumer perspective paper (e.g. on topics such as the availability of 
flood cover; the use of replacement value in flood insurance; the provision of 
premium discounts; and the development of alternative payment options).  
However, this does not mean that they were in line with the broader 
consumer views. For example, on the topic of whether or not home insurance should 
be made compulsory, the NDIR recommendation was in line with the position of 
insurers and the Brotherhood of St Lawrence, despite seven individual consumer 
submissions presenting an opposing view. According to Hindmarsh and Parkinson 
(2013) “the major form of public participation is submissions placed in a ‘black box’ 
for consideration or that invite their strategic selection for decisional influence.” The 
lack of a full alignment of NDIR recommendations with the positions expressed in the 
submissions of the dominant insurer advocacy coalition suggests that the formulation 
of balanced recommendations was not fully obstructed by differences in the power of 
insurers and consumers. However, as discussed in the following section, there was a 
shift in this balance during the phase of NDIR recommendation take-up. 
The NDIR’s final recommendations are permeated with spatial politics, related 
to different governance scales. For example, it is recommended that State and 
Territory governments participate in funding any shortfalls in a potential reinsurance 
pool. In addition, in relation to a recommendation for the provision of flood risk 
information, the NDIR report highlights that some local governments place 
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restrictions on access to information, whilst quality of mapping varies widely by 
location. Spatial differences in the availability and quality of flood maps were 
highlighted in the ICA submission (2011b), suggesting a degree of engagement by the 
coalition of insurers in this topic. The NDIR report also comments that state-level 
taxes on insurance are “inefficient”, but does not provide a firm recommendation on 
their removal, recognising the necessity of considering these taxes in the context of 
broader state level fiscal policy. The lack of engagement on this latter topic could be 
regarded as a weakness of the NDIR in its ability to carry out a problem-solving 
function due to limitations imposed by the (national) spatial scale at which it was 
operating. Yet there is no evidence that this was significantly influenced by the 
advocacy coalitions. 
 
Government response to NDIR recommendations and the ultimate role of the NDIR 
 
 We consider here which of Hunter and Boswell’s (2015) indicators of the role 
of public inquiries that relate to the post-inquiry period, including dissemination and 
take-up of recommendations. In doing so, we demonstrate that the ultimate role of 
the NDIR deviated from its intended problem-solving role, due in part to the influence 
of the insurer advocacy coalition during this period. 
Dissemination 
 
The final NDIR report was publicly released, along with the government’s 
response, in November 2011. The high-profile launch of the report by Shorten 
(Interviewee 2) is suggestive of a substantiating or legitimising inquiry (Hunter and 
Boswell, 2015). However, the media “didn’t really run with it” (Interviewee 2) because 
of the technical nature of the final report. According to Interviewee 3, by the time the 
report was released, many of the insurance claims associated with the 2010/2011 
floods had been resolved, and public interest in the issue of flood insurance had 
diminished. 
Recommendation take-up  
 
Following the formulation of public inquiry recommendations, in Australia the 
role of recommendation implementation usually lies with the government (Prasser, 
1985). This too was the case for the NDIR. In the case of policy issues about which 
there was limited discussion in consumer submissions (e.g. reinsurance facility and 
General Insurance Code of Practice), the government response was aligned with the 
position of the insurers, or the government referred the issue to the insurers for 
advice. In the case of policy issues about which there was limited discussion in insurer 
submissions (i.e. payment options), whilst the government position was initially 
aligned with that of consumers, after industry consultation that found obstacles to 
fortnightly payments through the Centrepay system (Treasury, 2011), the resulting 
lack of policy change was not aligned with the consumer position.  
For some policy issues, both consumer and insurer positions were largely 
aligned (e.g. flood risk information; premium discounts; and consumer awareness). 
Whilst on the topics of flood risk information and consumer awareness, the 
government in principle accepted the NDIR recommendations, which were aligned 
with both consumer and insurer perspectives, on the topic of premium discounts, the 
government rejected the NDIR recommendations, following a Productivity 
Commission. On policy issues for which there was a lack of alignment between insurer 
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and consumer perspectives (i.e. inclusion of flood cover in all home insurance 
policies; replacement value cover; and consumer choice over cover options), whereas 
the NDIR recommendations more aligned with the consumer advocacy coalition 
position, the government response was consistently aligned with the insurer 
advocacy coalition position. The alignment of the government’s response with the 
insurer position is discussed below, focussing on the four pivotal NDIR 
recommendations on which the 47 recommendations expand. 
Pivotal Recommendation 1 (Architecture) advocates the creation of a national 
flood risk management coordination agency (NDIR, 2011), highlighting an acceptance 
that the key scale of relevance for such a policy was national. In its response to this 
recommendation, the government noted its decision to establish a Flood Risk 
Information Portal, to coordinate the provision of flood risk information (Treasury, 
2011). The limited availability of flood maps had historically been one of the main 
factors limiting the ability of insurers to underwrite flood risk (Mason, 2011), and the 
ICA had been working on making flood risk data more available to insurers through 
the creation of the National Flood Information Database in 2008 (Mason, 2011). The 
ICA had been advocating the provision of more adequate flood data (ICA, 2011a).  
The availability of this data, however, has implications for the spatial politics of 
flood insurance policy discussions, with the ICA recently using this data to create a list 
of Australia’s most flood-prone federal electorates, which was released with an 
accompanying statement highlighting spatial disparities in data availability across 
political borders (ICA, 2019). Power struggles amongst governments operating at 
different spatial scales were evident in NDIR submissions such as that from the Local 
Government Association of Queensland, which argued that local government should 
not be obliged to “alter expenditure priorities and potentially increase liability risk 
exposures in order to ensure information is available for the commercial business 
purposes of insurers” (2011). Such statements also highlight the potentially less 
amicable nature of the relationship between insurers and local governments 
compared with that of insurers and the federal government. 
Pivotal Recommendation 2 (Availability) recommends that all home insurance 
policies include flood cover. This suggestion was not supported by the coalition of 
insurers, due to fears that insurers would be forced to take on risk beyond their 
appetite (IAG 2011). The recommendation was ultimately rejected by government 
(Australian Government, 2013). However, there has nonetheless been an increase 
since in the proportion of standard home and contents policies that include flood 
cover, with insurers taking the initiative themselves to offer flood cover (Interviewee 
3). The drivers for this positive development warrant further research.  
Pivotal Recommendations 3 (Affordability) and 4 (Funding) recommended the 
establishment of a flood risk reinsurance facility to deliver flood insurance policy 
discounts (assessed based on an affordability threshold). The recommended facility 
was designed such that insurers can cede risks to a pool, and the government 
guarantees payment of flood claims from the pool. Effectively, flood insurance 
discounts would be funded by taxpayers, a proposition supported by the coalition of 
insurers in their submissions as a means of addressing the affordability issue.  
However, despite their support for government discounts, most insurers 
opposed the introduction of a government flood reinsurance pool, with justifications 
reflecting the coalition’s anti-interventionist beliefs. Initially, the government 
responded that it would consider these recommendations following consultations 
with stakeholders. The Productivity Commission Inquiry into Regulatory and Policy 
Barriers to Effective Climate Change Adaptation, which was established by Shorten in 
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September 2011, recommended “governments should not subsidise household or 
business property insurance, whether directly or by underwriting risks” (Productivity 
Commission, 2012: 31). The Productivity Commission argued that “poorly designed 
regulatory intervention in insurance markets can create barriers to effective 
adaptation to climate change” (Productivity Commission, 2012: 315), with 
subsidisation potentially distorting incentives for efficient risk management. Key 
players from the insurance industry were actively involved in the Productivity 
Commission, with IAG and Suncorp opposing subsidisation on the grounds of the 
costs to the government.  
Ultimately the stance of the Productivity Commission was consistent with the 
insurance industry coalition’s anti-interventionist beliefs, as highlighted by its 
conclusion that “Without clear evidence of market failures or the distribution of 
outcomes across households, it would be difficult to design or justify intervention in 
insurance markets” (Productivity Commission, 2012: 320). Its position “basically 
wiped [the NDIR] recommendations” (Interviewee 2), and was accepted by the 
government (Australian Government, 2013), whose decision was supported by the 
ICA (ICA 2013). However, panel chair Trowbridge responded that the government’s 
decision means, “the primary affordability question for flood insurance remains 
unresolved” (insuranceNEWS, 2013), a position reinforced by Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 5 
and 7. Although the government may have welcomed an outcome that did not have a 
budgetary impact, according to Interviewee 2 the coalition of insurers were influential 
in the government’s decision not to establish the reinsurance pool: “At the end of the 
day the key players just weren’t prepared to support it and I think the government at 
the end of the day said, ‘Well, unless they’re prepared to come along with it, we’re 
not going to impose it on them.’” However, whilst the coalition of insurers was 
arguably very influential in the decision not to establish the reinsurance pool, it 
should be recognised that other political discussions were likely occurring 
simultaneously. Several recommendations relate to the role of governments at 
different spatial scales in funding any shortfall in the pool, with Recommendation 23 
suggesting “that the Commonwealth seek reimbursement of some portion of the 
shortfall from the State or Territory government in whose jurisdiction the flood 
occurred.” Thus spatial politics may have also been influential in the government’s 
decision; however, this did not surface in our interviews. 
The Review also made recommendations on consumer matters (NDIR, 2011). 
Some of these recommendations substantiate policies that the government had 
already begun consultation on, including the introduction of a standard definition of 
flood and key facts sheet for use in insurance policies, and amendments to the 
General Insurance Code of Practice (Australian Government, 2011). The ICA had been 
advocating  a standard definition of flood (ICA, 2011a). The establishment of such a 
definition had been previously attempted by the ICA, including through: advisory 
wordlines proposed in 1999, which were not generally adopted due to lack of 
authorisation under the Trade Practices Act (1974); and a definition proposed in 2008, 
which was rejected by the Australian Competition and Consumer Council (Mason, 
2011). The Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2012 (Commonwealth) and 
Insurance Contracts Amendment Regulation 2012 (Commonwealth) were passed in 
early 2012, introducing a standard definition of flood and a key facts sheet. These 
measures have the potential to resolve consumer misunderstanding (Bell, 2012; 
Interviewee 7), although, as argued by Interviewee 3, despite the government’s 
emphasis on the standard definition, it is only a small part of the issue of flood 
insurance policy in Australia. 
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According to Hunter and Boswell (2015), the recommendations of problem-
solving inquiries are usually implemented. Yet in the case of the NDIR, the 
implementation of the recommendations was largely impeded by the influence of the 
coalition of insurers, with the government reluctant to implement recommendations 
that industry opposed. Thus the intended problem-solving role of the NDIR (as 
revealed by the panel membership, resources, timeframe and terms of reference) 
was ultimately interrupted during the post-inquiry period. As summarised by 
Interviewee 3, “At the beginning, there was a genuine desire to solve the problem […] 
But it gets political in the end. […] There was lobbying by insurers to prevent 
intervention.” Yet the extent to which the lobbying process was driven purely by the 
insurer coalition is perhaps debateable, with its success likely hinging on a 
predisposition of the government to seek out, and ultimately agree to, the views of 
industry members given the insurers’ “trusted advisor” status (Interviewee 6). 
Stark (2018) also discusses the role of coalitions in the phase of 
implementation of inquiry recommendations, with a focus on the case of the 
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission. He argues that a coalition that lobbied on 
behalf of the Royal Commission’s recommendations was key to the eventual 
implementation of key policy recommendations regarding unreinforced masonry 
buildings. Yet Stark argues that the coalition that formed was not united by core 
beliefs, but rather beliefs regarding a particular policy, and it was a temporary 
coalition, dissipating after the policy had been implemented. In the case of the NDIR, 
however, the advocacy coalitions that were influential during and right through the 
phase of implementation of recommendations were founded on strong common core 
beliefs that endure to this day. 
Although public inquiries have been regarded as an avenue for public 
participation in policy processes (Richardson and Razzaque, 2006), this case study 
demonstrates that the impact of this public participation may ultimately be limited by 
the restricted participation of the public during the phase of implementation of public 
inquiry recommendations, as highlighted by the lack of involvement of the consumer 
coalition during this phase. Our findings about the phase of recommendation 
implementation also challenges the notion of public inquiries as a vehicle for 
accountability and transparency in government policy-making processes (Sales, 2004) 
Whilst we highlight that the NDIR itself provides a useful window into policy debates, 
there is less transparency during the phase of recommendation implementation; a 
phase that we show is significant for shaping the ultimate impact of the public inquiry 
on policy and on the lives of those at risk of flooding but which is more difficult to 
research. 
 
Conclusions 
 
On the basis of the ample available evidence, we conclude that the primary 
role of the NDIR was intended to be problem-solving, thus really intending to change 
the landscape for flood risk management in Australia and assist those people and 
their places at risk. If all the recommendations of the inquiry had been implemented, 
there would have been substantial impacts on the spatial distribution of costs of risk 
mitigation and risk sharing across geographies with different flood exposures.  
However, this function was obstructed during the government response phase 
due to its decisions not to take-up many of the key NDIR recommendations. Whilst 
the well-resourced insurance industry advocacy coalition came to the table and 
engaged deeply with the NDIR policy discussions, enabling the NDIR to deliver well-
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informed policy recommendations, its influence following the inquiry contributed to 
this lack of uptake of some of the key NDIR recommendations. Thus the intended 
problem-solving role of the NDIR was ultimately interrupted and some of its proposed 
policy changes were altered.  
In response to Stark’s (2015) hypothesis concerning the influence of advocacy 
coalitions in public inquiries, we find that in the NDIR the influence of the coalition of 
insurers was important during the government take-up phase of the inquiry more so 
than during the recommendation formulation phase. Accordingly our analysis 
demonstrates the importance of considering this recommendation implementation 
phase more carefully when examining the influence of advocacy coalitions in the 
public inquiry process and elsewhere (for such implementation issues see also Solik 
and Penning-Rowsell, 2017). Our analysis suggests that in order to influence policy, all 
advocacy coalitions must continue to engage in the policy process after 
recommendation formulation, during the phase of recommendation take-up, and 
have sufficient power resources to influence the outcomes of that crucial phase. 
The NDIR led to several important policy changes, including improvements in 
flood data accessibility and consumer understanding about flood cover; how these 
changes came about we can now see more clearly, thanks to the transparency of the 
public inquiry processes and the assistance of our interviewees. Other countries 
exploring flood insurance potentials may learn from this. Despite the disruption of the 
problem-solving function of the NDIR inquiry, industry-driven changes following the 
inquiry enabled an increase in the availability of flood insurance in Australia (this 
process needing further research). Yet the key issue of flood insurance affordability 
remains unresolved, to the detriment of support for households in flood-prone areas, 
with the spatial politics of the debate still simmering away. If this issue remains 
unresolved, the viability of flood insurance as an option in the portfolio of flood risk 
management strategies in Australia may diminish. But the NDIR is not the final 
chapter in Australian flood insurance policy discussions. Rather, given that many 
issues remain unresolved, the policy debate is likely to be catalysed afresh when 
major floods occur once again. 
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